This study analyzes the effect of the 2008 financial crisis on the venture capital market. We show that the crisis is associated with a decrease in the number of initial funding rounds as well as with a decrease in the amount of funds raised in later funding rounds. The effects of the crisis differed across industries and were stronger in the US than in other countries. We suggest that the crisis has led to a severe 'funding gap' in the financing of technological development and innovation.
Introduction
The years 2007 through 2009 will be known for a financial crisis (hereafter, crisis) regarded as one of the worst since the Great Depression of the 1930s (Almunia et al., 2009; Sinn, 2009 ). The crisis contributed to the failure of many well-known companies, led to a substantial decline in consumer wealth, produced enormous financial commitments incurred by governments, and resulted in a strong decline in economic activity. The crisis became visible to everyone with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the near-bankruptcy of American International Group (AIG) in September 2008 . Following these events, many other financial institutions in the US and around the world became affected and lost large portions of their value. Some of them could only be saved from bankruptcy by government interventions.
This chapter deals with the effects of the crisis on the venture capital (hereafter, VC) market.
Due to the strong links between the VC market and the financial markets in general, we expect a severe impact of the crisis on the VC market. VC is a very important source of funding for start-ups in innovative industries. VC is particularly important in the early phases of a firm's life, when it starts to develop innovative products and to commercialize its innovations (Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Jell et al., 2009; Zider, 1998) . In this start-up phase, a firm does not have many other institutions to turn to raise money. VC fills a void here. The inherent risks of a start-up in that phase are generally not accepted by banks (Bruns and Fletcher, 2008) . To avoid risks, banks often require tangible assets, which are usually not available with young, innovative firms. The stock market and public equity are also not accessible at this stage, as the size of the firm is still too small for an IPO to be considered. Consequently, if the crisis has led to a strong decrease in VC activity, a funding gap in the financing of technological development and innovation may have occurred or may continue to occur. This in turn may have negative effects on subsequent economic development and growth. Prior research has shown VC funding to have a strong positive impact on firm growth, technological development, and the evolution of industries (Audretsch and Thurik, 2001; Bottazzi et al., 2002; Florida and Kenney, 1988; Keuschnigg, 2004; Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Timmons and Bygrave, 1986) . For example, Kortum and Lerner (2000) find that an increase in an industry's VC activity leads to higher patent activity. It is estimated that VC is responsible for about 10% of US industrial innovation. Thus, if VC activity decreases -and patent application volumes with itadverse long-term effects on the economy may occur.
B. The questions explored in this study
Except for Block and Sandner (2009) , there is little empirical evidence regarding the impact of a financial crisis on VC activity. This study aims to shed more light on this issue. The following questions will be explored empirically: The remainder of this study is organized as follows: Section II describes the causes of the crisis and presents a timeline of the events associated with it. Section III summarizes the arguments for why the crisis may have affected the VC market. Section IV presents the empirical study, which is then discussed in Section V. Section VI discusses implications for start-ups and policy-makers and gives an outlook on further research.
II. The crisis: its causes and events
This section summarizes the causes of the crisis and provides an overview of the events associated with it. Many causes of the crisis have recently been proposed. The weight differs according to the expert questioned. We focus on three prominent explanations: the US housing bubble, the subprime crisis, and the deregulation of the financial markets in recent decades and the consequent creation of many complex financial innovations.
• US housing bubble: The years prior to the outbreak of the crisis were characterized by a strong increase in US housing prices. This housing bubble was related to increasing financial incentives for banks to engage in mortgage loans. The decrease in the federal funds rate from the year 2000 onwards coincided with larger profit margins for banks on mortgages. As a result, housing prices peaked in 2006; their value had roughly doubled over the preceding decade. This boom period in the housing market was most importantly characterized by a strong increase in the amount of high-risk or subprime mortgages, which are provided to borrowers with relatively low credit ratings.
• Subprime crisis: Between 2004 and 2007, the federal funds rate started to steadily increase again, rising from a one-percent level in 2004. This trend brought increasing expenses for borrowers holding adjustable-rate mortgages. The combination of an increasing federal funds rate with the growing share of (adjustable rate) subprime mortgages led to a severe increase in the number of homeowners defaulting on mortgage payments as well an increase in the number of foreclosures on properties. In August 2007, the first hedge funds crashed (e.g., Bear Stearns), holding large shares of mortgage derivatives. Lending behavior among banks also became affected by the subprime crisis. Increasing insecurity with regard to the credibility of other institutions made banks more reluctant to lend, leading to a tightening of their lending requirements.
• Deregulation and complex financial innovations: Government regulations did not prevent banks from providing larger shares of subprime mortgages. Rather, in 2004, the loosening of the net capital rule made banks able to take on larger proportions of debt.
Additionally, the increasing importance of the shadow banking system as a driving economic force fell under different governmental regulations, allowing for larger debt ratios. The increasing share of subprime mortgages was pooled and bundled into new financial products, selling them off to investors as CDOs (collateralized debt obligation) and MBS (mortgage-backed securities). The relatively safe credit ratings of these products contributed to an increasing demand of investors for mortgage-based derivatives.
Many events are associated with the crisis. To see the historical development and to understand the decisions that we made to produce our empirical results, we provide the following overview (see also Orlowski, 2008) .
• August 2007: Outbreak of subprime crisis (bankruptcy of Bear Stearns' in-house hedge fund).
• December 2007: Impact of subprime crisis starts to affect other asset areas. Aside from mortgage banks, a large number of financial institutions are affected.
• March 2008: Run on Bear Stearns, resulting from a period of increasing liquidity problems for banks.
• January 2008 to July 2008 With the decreasing value of CDOs, money begins shifting toward commodities. The commodity bubble reached its peak in July 2008.
• September 2008: Increasing liquidity problems result in the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the governmental takeover of AIG, which suffered from downgraded credit ratings.
Along with the credit freeze, this led to a strong downturn in stock prices.
III. Arguments for why the crisis may have affected the VC market
There exist several arguments for why the crisis may have had an effect on VC activity. The arguments can be grouped into two broad categories:
Decrease in the supply of money to VC funds: Due to the crisis, VC funds (operated by VC firms) had difficulties in finding investors. Investors in VC funds are typically pension funds, insurance companies, and large banks (Gompers and Lerner, 1998 crisis has led to lower valuations of VC-seeking start-ups, which also correspond to declines in stock prices on public equity markets.
IV. Empirical study

A. Measures and data
This section analyzes the effect of the crisis on VC activity across different industries and countries (US vs. non-US). The funding round will be our unit of analysis (i.e., the financing round in which start-ups raise money from one or multiple VC investors). We focus on two measures: (1) the number of funding rounds per month; (2) the amount of funds raised per funding round. Both measures will be calculated for the periods before and during the crisis.
Our data originates from the Thomson VentureXpert database (formerly known as Venture Economics), which has been widely used in the entrepreneurial financing literature (Bygrave, 1989; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001; Gompers and Lerner, 2004; Hochberg et al., 2007) . This decision contrasts with those of Block and Sandner (2009) , who used the database CrunchBase as a novel dataset. 4 Compared to CrunchBase, VentureXpert goes further back in time and is thus the largest available database on private equity and VC investments. It is updated on a daily basis using mainly public sources to gather its information (Gompers and Lerner, 2004) . When looking at this period on a monthly basis (see Figure 3) , we see that the VC market is rather fluctuant in its activity, making it difficult to determine the exact date the crisis started to have an effect on VC activity. The impact of the crisis somewhat stabilizes from January 2009 onwards, around a level of 400 funding rounds per month.
B. The VC market over the last two decades and the effect of the crisis
[Insert Figures 2 and 3 here]
To determine the date from which the crisis began to have an effect on VC activity, we need to take seasonal fluctuations into account. For example, throughout the five years preceding the crisis, the highest number of funding rounds always occurred in December and June, in contrast to the months of January and February, which often report the lowest amount of VC activity. Taking seasonal influences into account, Figure 4 compares the number of funding rounds for each month to the same time period in the previous year. This measure can be compared to the common meas-ure of GDP growth, which is also not an absolute but a relative measure but compares the GDP of [Insert Figure 4 here]
D. The effect of the crisis on VC activity across different industries
To measure the impact of the crisis, it is necessary to choose a date that determines the pre- had their peak, and a shift toward US treasuries and gold started (Orlowsky, 2008) .
To analyze whether the amount of funds raised per funding round changed due to the crisis, we calculated the median amount of funds raised per funding round before and during the crisis. We then used a Wilcoxon rank-sum test to find out whether the differences are statistically significant.
To avoid becoming unduly technical, we limit ourselves to this (rather simple) univariate analysis.
Using multivariate regressions, Block and Sandner (2009) have shown that controlling for factors such as the presence of an investment consortium, the age of the funded company, or the type of VC investor (business angel or VC fund) did not change the results substantially. between the effects of the crisis regarding the first and later funding rounds, a distinction which has been shown to make a great difference (Block and Sandner, 2009 ). In initial funding rounds, the funds raised provide initial money to start-ups. Second and later rounds equip start-up firms with additional funds so that they can continue with their development, marketing, or internationalization efforts.
[Insert Table 1 here] start-ups during the crisis than during the pre-crisis period. Within these industries, the percentage decrease in first-round investments is about four times larger than the decrease in later-round investments. In summary, during the crisis, VC activity slowed down. The crisis affected the number of first-round investments to a greater extent than the number of second-and later-round investments.
Second, the amount of funds raised in each funding round decreased to a greater degree in later funding rounds than in first rounds. 
E. The effect of the crisis on VC activity: US vs. non-US
Although the crisis started in the US, it became a global phenomenon. Through trade and capital flows, the crisis spread from the US to other countries (Alumnia et al., 2009) . Some countries outside the US experienced even larger drops in manufacturing production, exports, and equity prices. In Europe, the Baltic countries and the Republic of Iceland in particular were hit extremely hard, leading these countries toward a state of near-insolvency. Different countries have responded differently to the crisis, notably with varying monetary and fiscal policies. For these reasons, we expect the effects of the crisis on VC to differ across countries. Due to the limited number of VC deals outside the US (in our dataset), we focus on a US versus non-US comparison. Although it would be preferable to look at the effects of the crisis in different countries in greater detail, we defer this question to future inquiry. Tables 3 and 4 compare the consequences of the crisis for start-ups located in the US to the consequences for those outside the US. Table 3 defines the beginning of the crisis as July 1, 2008. It shows that the decrease in the number of funding rounds per month is stronger within the US than outside the US. This difference is particularly strong for first-round investments (−42% in the US vs. −19% outside the US). The reductions in VC activity reported in Table 4 , taking September 16, 2008, as the cutoff date, are similar. It seems that the VC market in the US has been more strongly affected by the financial crisis than the VC market outside the US. This finding is also supported by our second measure. The decrease in the amount of funds raised per funding round is significant for the VC market in the US but insignificant for the VC market outside the US.
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 here]
V. Summary of main findings and discussion
A. Summary of main findings
The main findings from our empirical study in Section IV are as follows:
• The crisis led to a decrease in the number of funding rounds. This decrease was generally stronger for the first funding round than for later funding rounds. The effect could be observed across all industries. It was highest in Internet (−46%) and lowest in Industrial/Energy (−18%).
• The amount of funds raised per funding round decreased. This decrease was generally stronger for later than for first funding rounds. In addition, the decrease in the amount of funds raised per funding round differed across industries. • Finally, the slowdown of VC activity due to the crisis has been more severe in the US than outside the US. This applies to both the number of funding rounds and the amount of funds raised in each funding round.
B. Discussion of the results
Our results show that the crisis strongly impacted the VC market: the market is down in both the number of investment dollars and the number of deals (see Tables 1 and 2 ). Interestingly, this effect differed with regard to the stage of financing. The decrease in the number of deals can primarily be observed in first funding rounds, whereas the decrease in the number of investment dollars occurred in later funding rounds. How can these results be explained? The lower number of deals in the first founding round is most likely due to stricter investment criteria by VC firms.
compared to the period before the crisis, the VC firms have less money to invest, are more critical about their VC investments, and tend to postpone their investments. Not surprisingly, they are less willing to take risks than they were before the crisis. Accordingly, start-ups that still receive VC funding are at later development stages and are, ceteris paribus, thus associated with lower risks (i.e., they might already have developed a prototype or established first customer contacts). Additionally, these entrepreneurs are in a different situation than they were before the crisis. If possible, they postpone their costly development and internationalization plans until the capital markets stabilize. Some entrepreneurs might even refrain from starting a company at all because they do not expect to obtain adequate financing. Entrepreneurs at early-stage companies might also consider alternative employment options. The situation is different for later-stage start-ups. These start-ups find themselves in a dilemma. Despite the lower valuations and the declining VC market, they still need later-stage funding to survive. In turn, the VC investors face the choice of either partly writing off their past investments or committing to providing fresh money in subsequent rounds of financing. Most likely, the VC investors will commit to new rounds of financing, but they are prone to lower the amount of funds they invest. These start-ups are in a weak negotiation position vis-à-vis the VC firm(s). They need the VC capital to survive. In a nutshell, later-stage ventures find themselves in a kind of 'lock-in situation' and cannot avoid the lower valuation of their firm by VCs.
Early-stage start-ups have more alternatives (including to not start the venture) and thus appear to be in a more comfortable and flexible position.
An alternative explanation for the drop in investment dollars is the following: an important difference between early-and later-stage ventures is associated with the unhealthy state of the IPO market. VC firms do not provide 'patient' capital. Instead, they intend to sell the firm in which they have invested after a few years. Conducting an IPO in a recession is not an attractive option.
Following this logic, firms at later stages of the venture cycle become less attractive as investment targets, especially because the prospects of a revival of the IPO market in the short term are poor. Cumming et al. (2005) show that when exit markets are illiquid, VC investors invest proportionally more in early-stage projects. In turn, when exit markets are liquid, VCs invest more in later-stage ventures. Another explanation not related to valuation issues concerns the process of staging itself.
The crisis and the greater uncertainty about the prospects for the economy might have increased the tendency of VCs to stage their investments. This tendency should be stronger with start-ups in later stages of the venture cycle, as the money at stake for the VCs is larger.
Our empirical study also shows that the crisis had a stronger effect on the VC market in the US than elsewhere. From a theoretical standpoint, this seems surprising. In a world of efficient financial markets (Fama, 1970) , there should not exist any differences. VC money is not bound to borders and can flow to wherever the best start-ups are located. If the crisis led to an external shock in the supply of VC money, the effect on the amount of deals and investment dollars should be similar in every country. The fact that the effect of the crisis seems to differ across countries shows market imperfections, which can be explained by irrational economic behavior and psychological pitfalls (e.g., Akerlof and Shiller, 2009; Klodt, 2009) . Examples of such behavior are the tendency to overestimate our own skills (Thaler, 2000) , the tendency to pay less attention to information questioning our decisions than to information supporting our decisions (Brehm, 1956) , and the endowment effect (Kahnemann and Tversky, 1979; Knetsch, 1989) . These types of irrational behavior may exist in both the VC market and the financial market in general. Our results suggest that imperfections in the VC market were greater in the US than in other countries. Accordingly, the effects of the crisis should also be greater in the US.
VI. Implications and further research
A. Implications
The implications of our findings can be grouped into (1) implications for start-ups seeking VC funding and (2) implications for the evolution of innovative industries and technological development:
• Implications for start-ups: Our results show that start-ups that sought VC were affected by the crisis. Start-ups that had already received initial funding and wanted (or needed) to raise further funds faced a discount as a result of the crisis (the extent of this discount varied between industries and countries; see Tables 1 to 4 ). This discount was most likely a result of valuation changes by VC investors. One lesson of this crisis is that start-ups seeking later-stage financing should try to foresee such developments and adapt their business planning accordingly. Cutting costs or postponing expansion plans may be adequate reactions. In times of a financial and/or economic crisis, they will encounter difficulties in raising the funds required to further finance their product development, marketing, and internationalization efforts. Our results also show that the crisis led to a drop in the number of initial funding rounds. We suggest that VC firms became more selective as a reaction to the financial crisis. Or, in other words: start-ups that sought VC during the crisis had to fulfill stricter criteria during the crisis than before it. Entrepreneurs that seek initial funding should keep this in mind and think about alternative sources of funds, such as angel investors or bank loans (Cassar, 2004; Harrison and Mason, 2000) . If there exist no alternatives to VC money (as is often the case), entrepreneurs might consider changing the way they communicate to potential VC funders, e.g., they might adjust their business plans and stress that the chances of success of their particular start-up are rather immune to the development of a crisis.
They might also consider playing down some risks associated with their start-up. An alternative strategy would be to look for some sort of bridge financing from sources other than VC money. Finally, our results show that the effect of the crisis on VC activity differed across industries and countries. Industry differences can be explained by the varying potential of business models in different areas; country differences can be explained by market imperfections caused by different degrees of irrational economic behavior and psychological pitfalls (Akerloff and Shiller, 2009; Klodt, 2009 ). Startups seeking VC should be aware of these imperfections in their business planning.
•
Implications for the evolution of innovative industries and technological development:
VC is an important means of funding for start-ups in innovative and technologydriven industries because it is the vehicle used to turn innovative ideas into products that can be sold to customers (Jell, Block, and Henkel, 2009; Zider, 1998) . VC particularly matters when firms conduct R&D and start to commercialize their innovations, that is, when they develop their products, apply for patents, look for distribution partners, seek initial customers, conduct their internationalization strategies, or simply scale up their operations (Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Zider, 1998) . VC firms not only provide financial means but also offer non-financial benefits such as management support and access to experts or existing business networks (Large and Muegge, 2008; Schefczyk and Gerpott, 2001 ). Florida and Kenney (1988, p. 119) see VC firms as "technological gatekeepers accelerating the process of technological change." Thus, the VC market drying up can have long-lasting negative effects with regard to the evolution of innovative industries (Audretsch and Thurik, 2001; Bottazzi et al., 2002; Kortum and Lerner, 2000) . Innovative start-ups might face illiquidity, and the speed of commercialization of technological innovations might slow down. Ultimately, a country's or an industry's path of evolution can be adversely affected. Governments should be aware of these negative side-effects of the financial crisis, as they might determine their country's innovative capacity. Therefore, far, the policy responses to the crisis have been designed to avoid a credit crunch (Gern and Janssen, 2009; Sinn, 2009) , that is, to avoid a collapse of the credit market for small and large firms. Our results regarding the effect of the crisis on the VC market suggest that this may not be enough:
many innovative firms do not rely on debt but rather on VC as a source of financing.
Avoiding a credit crunch helps established (small and large) firms in established industries rather than start-ups in innovative industries.
B. Further research
This is one of the first studies to empirically document and analyze the effects of a financial crisis on VC activity (Block and Sandner, 2009) . VC has become an element vital to the current economy and an important source of funding for innovative start-ups (Gompers, 1994; Jell, Block, and Henkel, 2009) . In this study, we show that a financial crisis can have a strong, exogenous 10,000
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